Recent Developments: McIntryre v. State: Totality of the Circumstances Test Uphead in Determining Validity of a Juvenile Miranda Waiver by Feldman, Robert
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 18
Number 1 Fall, 1987 Article 8
1987
Recent Developments: McIntryre v. State: Totality
of the Circumstances Test Uphead in Determining
Validity of a Juvenile Miranda Waiver
Robert Feldman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Feldman, Robert (1987) "Recent Developments: McIntryre v. State: Totality of the Circumstances Test Uphead in Determining
Validity of a Juvenile Miranda Waiver," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 18 : No. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol18/iss1/8
Recent Developments 
McIntryre v. State: TOTAliTY OF 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST 
UPHEAD IN DETERMINING 
VALIDITY OF A JUVENILE 
MIRANDA WAIVER 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 526 A.2d 30 
(1987), held that a juvenile's request to see 
a parent is not a per se request for an 
attorney. Consequently, once Miranda 
warnings are given, the court of appeals 
will still apply the totality of the cir-
cumstances test to determine if a subse-
quent confession is voluntary and the 
Miranda waiver valid. 
McIntyre involved a fifteen year old who 
had been arrested and charged with rape. 
When he was arrested the detectives 
informed him of his Miranda rights "inclu-
ding the right to remain silent, to talk to 
a lawyer and to have the lawyer present 
during any police questioning." Id. at 609, 
526 A.2d at 31. The defendant ack-
nowledged that he comprehended these 
rights but asked to see his mother. Since he 
was charged as an adult, the interrogating 
officer denied his request. 
At the police station, the defendant was 
again advised of his rights and again 
indicated they were understood. At this 
time he made another request to see his 
mother which was also denied. After this 
refusal, the defendant waived his Miranda 
rights in writing. He then proceeded to 
make an exculpatory statement which was 
later used at trial. 
During the trial, defense counsel 
objected to the introduction of the Miran-
da waiver form, stating that McIntyre's 
"requests [for his mother] were tanta-
mount to a request for counsel because 
that's how he would have gotten [sic] 
counsel." Id. at 2. The trial court then held 
a suppression hearing to determine if 
Miranda was properly given and voluntari-
ly waived. 
When such a waiver is at issue, the state 
must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the statement was voluntary. 
See State v. Kidd 181 Md. 32, 375 A.2d 
1105, eert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (19n). An 
important factor in proving voluntariness 
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is the absence of police coercion or 
intimidation, Colorado v. Connelly, 107 
S.Ct. 515 (1987). Here, the interrogating 
detective, Myers, testified that the defen-
dant said he understood his Miranda 
rights, appeared nervous but not frighten-
ed, was not flustered or excited, and that 
his request to see his mother was "just a 
matter of fact question, and not an emo-
tional request." McIntyre, 309 Md. at 610, 
526 A.2d at 31. Myers also testified that 
there were not threats or promises made to 
the defendant to induce him to waive his 
Miranda rights. Furthermore, Myers testi-
fied that McIntyre never asked to see an 
attorney. 
The trial court applying the totality of 
the circumstances test, denied the suppres-
sion motion. Additionally, the trial judge 
stated that a juvenile does not have a right 
to have a parent present when a statement, 
is made. Id, 309 Md. at 611, 526 A.2d at 32. 
After conviction, the defendant appealed 
to the court of special appeals which held 
that as long as the statement is voluntary, 
a parent's absence has "no bearing on the 
admissibility of the voluntary statement." 
Id. Due to the importance of the issue as to 
whether the denial of parental access to a 
fifteen year old violates the fifth and sixth 
amendments, the court of appeals granted 
certiorari. 
The defendant's counsel argued for the 
adoption of a per se rule, that involves the 
Miranda request for counsel, whenever a 
juvenile asks to see his parents or another 
interested adult. The court of appeals 
rejected this argument stating that the per 
se rule established in Miranda was that a 
lawyer is the person who is in the best 
position to protect the fifth amendment 
rights of a client undergoing custodial 
interrogation. Fare v. Michael c: 442 U.S. 
707,719, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979). 
Therefore, this per se rule distinguishes a 
request for a probation officer or close 
friend from a request for counsel. Id at 722. 
In Fare, a sixteen year old under custodi-
al interrogation requested to speak with 
his probation officer, a person he trusted. 
The court rejected Fare's per se argument, 
indicating that probation officers are not 
usually versed in the law and they could 
not properly advise the juvenile. This 
reasoning is similar to the case at bar, 
where there was "[no] evidence to show 
that McIntyre's mother would have been 
able to advise him of his legal rights." 
McIntyre, 309 Md. at 626, 526 A.2d at 39. 
Another reason for refusing to expand 
Miranda's reach is that a request for any 
trusted individual could be deemed a 
request for counsel. This would circum-
vent part of Miranda's goal, which is to 
allow suspects the opportunity of acquir-
ing legal advice. (emphasis added). 
To determine if a waiver is valid, it must 
be done voluntarily and without police 
coercion of any kind. North Carolina v. 
Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, (1979). To deter-
mine voluntariness, the totality of the cir-
cumstances test is used, even where a 
juvenile is involved. Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at 
724-5. The factors examined are: the sus-
pects age, intelligence, education, experi-
ence, suggestibility, and mental and 
physical health; the police officer's treat-
ment of the suspect; and the methods and 
length of interrogation. Lodowski v. State, 
307 Md. 233, 254-55, 513 A.2d 299 (1986). 
In the present case, the trial record 
reflected that the defendant understood his 
rights, was not confused, the questioning 
was brief, the statement was exculpatory, 
he was of normal intelligence to under-
stand his rights, no threats or promises 
were made and probably most important-
ly, there was never a request to see an 
attorney. McIntyre, 309 Md. at 526 A.2d 
38. The court noted that age is a factor, but 
"age in itself, does not render a confession 
involuntary." Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 
379, 247 A.2d 520 (1968). The court fur-
ther observed that a child who is arrested 
must have his parents notified, but declin-
ed to rule on whether a child who is charg-
ed as an adult has such a right. 
The court of appeals did observe that a 
few jurisidictions do equate a "juvenile's 
request to see their parents with requests 
to consult an attorney." See, e.g., People v. 
Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793,99 Cal. 
Rept 1 (1971). 
Nevertheless, the court rejected the per 
se approach and decided to continue using 
the totality of the circumstances test 
because it allows for consideration of other 
factors which serve to better protect the 
interests of society and of justice. Mdntyre, 
309 Md. at 622, 623, 526 A.2d at 37. (citing 
from Com fJ. Christmas, 502 Pa. 213, 465 
A.2d 989, 992 (1983». Applying this test, 
the court found that the defendant's "mere 
requests to see his mother, [under] the cir-
cumstances, [did not] factually constitute 
an invocation of his right to remain silent, 
"nor did it invoke his right to counsel." Id 
at 625, 526 A.2d at 39. 
There was a lengthy and strongly word-
ed dissent filed by Judge Adkins. The dis-
sent argued that even if a juvenile appears 
mature, etc., he cannot be held to unders-
tand the full ramifications of being 
arrested. Other jurisdictions provide safe-
guards for juveniles including a per se rule 
invalidating waivers, See, e.g., People fJ. Bur· 
ton, supra and special legislation, See, e.g. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§466-136 and 466-
137 (West 1987). (holding inadmissible 
confessions, statements or admissions 
made by a juvenile unless made in the pres-
ence of a parent or guardian) Mdntyre, 309 
Md. at 629, 526 A.2d at 40 (Adkins, J. dis-
senting). The dissent was adamant that 
Mdntyre's repeated requests for his mother 
should have been treated as a request for a 
lawyer. 
Furthermore, even by using the totality 
of the circumstances test, the state failed to 
show that Mdntyre had the necessary intel-
ligence, knowledge, maturity or any previ-
ous experience with the criminal justice 
system. 309 Md. at 635, 526 A.2d at 44. 
The court observed that Lodo'Wski dictates 
an adequate record is of utmost impor-
tance to determine if there was a constitu-
tional waiver or. rights. Id at 636, 526 A.2d 
at 44. Since the trial record was notably 
scant, the dissent urged that the conviction 
be reversed and a new trial be held. 
The court of appeals' ruling appears to 
be stating that when a juvenile is charged 
as an adult, he or she will be considered an 
adult even under the totality of the cir-
cumstances test. Also, the court will not 
consider age by itself, but will look to 
other outside factors in determining if a 
valid waiver of Miranda rights has been 
made. 
-Robert Feldman 
Booth v. Maryland: VICTIM IMPACT 
STATEMENTS INADMISSABLE AT 
SENTENCING HEARING IN 
CAPITAL MURDER CASE 
In Booth fJ. Maryland, 107 S.Ct. 2529 
(1987), the Supreme Court of the United 
States in a 5-4 decision, delivered by Justice 
Powell, rejected the introduction of victim 
impact statements (VIS) at the sentencing 
phase of a capital murder trial. The Court 
reasoned that such information was irrele-
vant to the blameworthiness of a particular 
defendant and therefore violative of the 
eighth- amendment's prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment. In rejecting 
the consideration of the VIS, the Court 
invalidated a Maryland statute to the 
extent that it mandated the compilation of 
a VIS in all felony cases. 
In Booth, the victims, Irvin and Rose 
Bronstein were robbed and brutally mur-
dered in their West Baltimore home by 
John Booth and Willie Reid. Booth, a 
neighbor of the elderly couple apparently 
entered the home to steal money in order 
to purchase heroin. Due to Booth's fear of 
identification by the victims, he and Reid 
gagged the Bronsteins and then stabbed 
them repeatedly with a kitchen knife. Two 
days later, the Bronsteins' son discovered 
the bodies of his murdered parents. 
A jury found Booth guilty of two counts 
of first-degree murder, two counts of rob-
bery and conspiracy to commit robbery. 
Prior to the sentencing phase of the trial, 
the State Division of Parole and Probation 
submitted a presentence report which 
described Booth's background, employ-
ment history, education, and criminal 
record. Pursuant to Md. Ann. Code art. 
41, § 4-609(c) (1986), the presentence 
report included a VIS, describing the 
detrimental effects of the crime on the vic-
tim's family and society in general. 
Defense counsel moved to suppress the 
VIS on the ground that it was "irrelevant 
and unduly inflammatory, and that there-
fore its use in a capital case violated the 
Eighth Amendment of the Federal Consti-
tution." Booth. 107 S.Ct. at 2532. Denying 
the motion, the trial court submitted the 
information to the jury, who subsequently 
sentenced Booth to death. On automatic 
appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed both the conviction and the sen-
tencing decision. Booth fJ. State. 306 Md. 
172,507 A.2d 1098 (1986). The court, rely-
ing on Lodowski '0. State, 302 Md. 691, 490 
A.2d 1228 (1985) concluded that the VIS 
was not an arbitrary factor in the sentenc-
ing process, but rather an informative 
technique by which the sentencing body 
could measure the full extent of the harm 
caused by the perpetrator of the crime. 
The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
Justice Powell distinguished between the 
use of a VIS in an ordinary civil or 
criminal case as opposed to the unique cir-
cumstance of a capital sentencing hearing. 
A VIS, in the vast majority of cases, pro-
vides the jury with two types of informa-
tion. Initially, it describes the personal 
characteristics of the victim and the emo-
tional impact of the crime(s) on the family. 
Secondly, it sets forth the family members' 
opinions and characterizations of the 
crimes and the defendant. Booth, 107 U.S. 
at 2533. In Booth, the VIS was based on 
interviews with the Bronsteins' son, 
daughter, son-in-law and granddaughter. 
The interviewer, an employee of the Divi-
sion of Parole and Probation, compiled the 
information, comments and reactions of 
the family and prepared a VIS which was 
then considered by the jury during their 
deliberation of Booth's sentence. 
The Court, in evaluating all plausible 
arguments as to the relevancy and effec-
tiveness of the VIS, discusses several poten-
tially unconstitutional results which 
illustrated the danger of allowing juries to 
consider this information. First, the Court 
noted that the function of the sentencing 
jury is to "express the conscience of the 
community on the ultimate question of 
life or death." Witherspoon 'V. Illinois, 391 
U.S. 510, 519 (1968). In so doing, the jury 
is required to focus on the particular defen-
dant as a "uniquely individual human 
bein[g]." Woodson fJ. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 304 (1976). Applying this ration-
ale, the Court explained that "the focus of 
a VIS is not on the defendant, but on the 
character and reputation of the victim and 
the effect on his family. These factors may 
be wholly unrelated to the blamewor-
thiness of a particular defendant. Booth, 
107 S.Ct. at 2534. "Allowing the jury to 
rely on a VIS therefore could result in 
imposing the death sentence because of fac-
tors about which the defendant was 
unaware, and that were irrelevant to the 
decision to kilL" Id. Consequently, the 
Court found that the nature of the infor-
mation contained in a VIS created an 
impermissible risk that the capital sentenc-
ing decision would be made in an arbitrary 
manner. 
Secondly, the Court addressed the dan-
gers of imposing the death penalty based 
ont he ability of the family members to 
articulate their grief and the extent of their 
loss. U[I]n some cases the victim will not 
leave behind a family, or the family mem-
bers may be less articulate in describing 
their feelings even though their sense of 
loss is equally severe." Id. The fact that the 
imposition of the death penalty could turn 
on such unfair distinctions posed constitu-
tional problems for the Court. 
Finally, the Court examined the difficul-
ty of rebutting the implications of the VIS, 
without shifting the focus of the sentenc-
ing hearing away from the defendant. 
"Presumably the defendant would have 
the right to cross-examine the declarants, 
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